There are many instances, both in professional domains such as law, forensics, and medicine, and in everyday life, where an effect (e.g. a piece of evidence or event) has multiple possible causes.
Introduction explanations, the general case for which is illustrated by the common-effect Bayes Net structure of Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1.
Common-effect scenario, with H1 and H2 representing the two claims, both candidate causes of positive (true) test results; the conditional probability table of test is included, where P(E|H1, H2) results from assuming a noisyOR, see Pearl, 1988) . Priors of both claims are arbitrarily set to 0.5. t0: No evidence has been observed. t1: Evidence observed as True.
In this example the evidence of a positive test is observed (t0 to t1), increasing the probability of both hypotheses -despite the fact that the LR of the evidence for H1 against H2 is equal to 1. Equivalent examples include multiple diseases and a medical test, multiple explanations of a person's behaviour (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) , or multiple explanations for a crime. In all such cases, the danger is that people mistakenly judge crucial evidence to be nonprobative, because they focus on whether the evidence discriminates between the target hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis (H1 versus H2), rather than between the target hypothesis and its negation (H1 versus ~H1). It is the latter comparison that is critical for determining whether the evidence supports (or undermines) the target hypothesis (H1). 1 In our example we used priors of 0.5 for each hypothesis, but this was an illustrative choice. In fact, the key pattern of inference -whereby evidence that has LR=1 for H1 vs H2 is still probative for H1 vs not-H1 -holds irrespective of the priors of the hypotheses (so long as these are neither 0 or 1), given plausible assumptions about the conditional probability table for the evidence E (see proofs in Supplementary materials A).
Zero-sum reasoning
We posit that this error is based on the misconception of evidential support as a finite, shared resource across the hypotheses under contention. This "zero-sum" conceptualisation of support is appropriate only if hypotheses truly are both exclusive and exhaustive. But, in general, evidential support is not a zero-sum game, and reasoning from this assumption can lead to ignoring valuable evidence.
The notion of zero-sum effects has been explored in psychology, where people inappropriately "cap" available resources -whether predictions of student grade quality (Meegan, 2010) or "fixed-pie" beliefs (Smithson & Shou, 2016) -with the resulting assumption that positivity in one domain corresponds to negativity in another (e.g. "When the rich get richer, the poor get poorer."). This effect relates to the notion of "hydraulic" action (attribution to one must be balanced by substitution from another), explored in work on social attribution (Kanouse, 1972; Lepper & Greene, 1978; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) , where people judge that more support for a behaviour (e.g. an angry outburst) due to an intrinsic explanation (e.g. being an angry person) must correspond to less support for an extrinsic explanation (e.g. the situation). We propose a zero-sum reasoning fallacy, wherein the degree of support across multiple explanations is considered fixed, such that evidence that does not distinguish between these explanations is deemed irrelevant. Critically, this is based on a false assumption of exclusivity and exhaustiveness across explanations, when in fact the same evidence can offer support for both explanations.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 demonstrates the zero-sum fallacy. We predict that when presented with evidence that should increase support for both hypotheses, lay reasoners will erroneously judge it irrelevant. Conversely, when presented with evidence that should decrease support for both hypotheses, we predict reasoners will correctly use this evidence to disconfirm both hypotheses, because correct responding ("ruling out" explanations) does not require hypotheses to be treated as non-exclusive.
Method
Participants. A total sample size of 50, with 25 participants per test result condition, (yielding 100 observations) was predetermined. Participants were recruited and participated online through MTurk (https://www.mturk.com/). Those eligible for participation had a 95% and above approval rating from over 100 prior tasks. Participants were English speakers, located in the United States. One participant was removed for incomplete responses. Of the 49 participants remaining, 26 were female. The mean age was 33.37 (SD = 10.27). Participants were paid $1 for their time (Median = 5.87 minutes, SD = 5.54). On a separate page, after each scenario judgment, participants were asked to "Please briefly provide some reasoning for your decision regarding the previous scenario in the text box below." (Not reported in the present paper). Along with demographics, scenario order and time taken were recorded. Participants were paid for their time.
Results
All analyses were Bayesian, and performed using the JASP statistical software (JASP Team, 2016) 2 . Importantly, the use of Bayes Factors allows us to infer evidence for the null hypothesis, wherein BF10 < 1/3 rd is considered strong support for the null (Dienes, 2014) .
Judgment Data. Each of the 49 participants made 4 judgments. Fig. 2 shows the mean proportions of these judgments, split by test result condition. Lastly, Bayesian contingency tables were used to check whether scenario order or type influenced judgments. Neither scenario order, BF10 = 3.56 * 10 -4 , nor type, BF10 = 0.002, influenced judgments, with decisive evidence for the null in both instances.
Discussion
Positive evidence is judged as irrelevant significantly more than negative evidence. This fits with our predictions, given the negative test does not require the introduction of "new" resources (the "sum" part of zero-sum), but instead reduces support (i.e. the negative test disconfirms both hypotheses). These results are not influenced by scenario order (i.e. no effects of learning or attentional attrition), or type (indicating context generalizability).
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examines two key questions. First, is the error due to a failure to consider with the same general procedure, but to address the questions of Experiment 2, the following changes were made:
To address the exhaustiveness issue, a between-subject factor was introduced, in which an explicit statement regarding non-exhaustiveness was either present ("Non-Exhaustiveness
Statement") or absent (control). This, in conjunction with the test result between-subject manipulation, led to a 2 x 2 design. The non-exhaustiveness statement preceded the standard judgment question, and used the following structure:
To address the confidence question, a confidence measure was included directly below the judgment question. The phrasing of this question was "How confident are you that your response is correct?" using a slider to indicate from 0% to 100% (no default value; see
Supplementary Materials C for an example scenario).
Accordingly, as participants completed each of the 4 scenarios in a random order, they made a judgment, expressed their confidence in that judgment, before moving on to provide some reasoning.
Results
Judgment Data. Each of the 193 participants made 4 judgments, resulting in a total of 772 judgments. Fig. 3 shows the mean proportions of these judgments, split by test result condition (columns) and exhaustiveness manipulation (rows). As in Experiment 1, participant judgments were coded into a single, summary correct responding variable. We conducted a Bayesian ANOVA with the test result and exhaustiveness manipulation between subject factors. As can be seen in Table 1 , correct responding was significantly higher in negative (vs positive) test result conditions, BFInclusion 4 = 607.57, and the non-exhaustiveness statement (vs control) also led to higher correct responding, BFInclusion = 9.02.
As the interaction was not significant, the model with these two main factors was considered the best fit, BFM = 6.86, and significant overall, BF10 = 5031.76. Breaking down the main effect of the exhaustiveness manipulation by test result, the increase in correct responding was found in As can be seen in the final column of Table 1 , all correct responding rates were significantly greater than chance level, with the single exception of the positive test result participants who did not receive the non-exhaustiveness statement.
Lastly, using Bayesian contingency tables, the potential confounds of scenario order and type did not impact judgments, with strong support for the null in both the former, BF10 = 8.93 * 10 -6 , and the latter, BF10 = 0.02.
Confidence Data. Fig. 4 shows the boxplot breakdown of confidence by judgment type (within-pane), test result condition (columns) and exhaustiveness manipulation (rows). 
In line with previous experiments, correct responding in negative test result conditions was significantly greater than chance (top 2 rows of Table 2 ), which occurred irrespective of exclusivity manipulation. Interestingly, in the positive test result condition, when an exclusivity constraint was made explicit, correct responding was significantly greater than chance levelwhich was not the case in the control condition.
Lastly, as in Experiments 1 and 2, using Bayesian contingency tables, judgments were , with very strong evidence for the null in both cases.
Confidence Data. Fig. 6 shows the boxplot breakdown of confidence by judgment type (within-pane), test result condition (columns) and exclusivity manipulation (rows). 
Discussion
Experiment 3 demonstrates that the distinctive zero-sum pattern of reasoning holds even when leak values for tests are included, and when exclusivity constraints are made explicit.
Replicating Experiment 2 these errors are given with equally high confidence as correct responses, corroborating a "misplaced faith" in such errors.
General Discussion
Three experiments present evidence for the zero-sum fallacy. Experiment 1 showed the fallacy in positive test cases, comparing it directly with negative test cases, where no such error is made. Experiment 2 explicitly stated that the candidate hypotheses were non-exhaustive; an intervention that reduced errors in negative test cases (although we note some weak evidence for improved correct-responding in positive test cases). Experiment 3 showed no significant impact on the pattern of reasoning when hypotheses were stated to be exclusive, and also that erroneous reasoning was not due to participants believing that the tests were generally non-diagnostic.
Further experiments have also shown that the fallacy holds even when likelihoods differ.
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In addition, the inclusion of confidence measures showed that both erroneous and correct judgments were held with high confidence.
We conjecture that this bias arises because people treat evidence as a zero-sum game, whereby alternative hypotheses compete for evidential support. Thus, evidence that favours one hypothesis must thereby disfavour alternative hypotheses. This assumption prohibits people from seeing that the same piece of evidence can simultaneously confirm alternative hypotheses. More precisely, lay reasoners assume that evidence which is equally predicted by two competing hypotheses offers no support for either hypothesis. However, this assumption only holds when the competing hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In the contexts presented in these experiments, and in many real-world contexts such as law and medicine, these conditions do not hold, and yet people persist in disregarding evidence that is genuinely probative of the key hypothesis of interest.
Reasoning under zero-sum assumptions seems to be a compelling heuristic that will often simplify inference and promote clear-cut decision making. But when conditions of exclusivity or exhaustiveness fail, as in many real world situations, reasoners will overlook crucial evidence. 
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